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I. A BRIEF HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF LIVING WILLS
In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed parents to remove
a life support system from the body of their daughter after doctors
deemed her vegetative state irreversible." The case, In re Quinlan,2 re-
ceived extensive national media attention3 and pitted concerns about
the quality of life and personal autonomy against respect for the sanc-
1. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Friedrich, "Into the Hands of the Lord" at Last: Karen Ann Quinlan: 1954-
1985, TIME, June 24, 1985, at 76; Woodward, To Live and Let Die, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 58.
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tity of life. This conflict has intensified as medical technology has
progressed so that patients who otherwise would die faster, natural
deaths now are sustained indefinitely. Some patients and families see
this life support as medical heroism, while others view it as painful,
futile prolongation of death.4
One solution for those who wish to avoid indefinite life support is
the drafting of a living will. A living will is the individual's written di-
rective specifying that if the individual becomes terminally ill or goes
into an irreversible vegetative state, the individual's care givers should
not use artificial life support procedures. The primary purpose of a liv-
ing will is to ensure that the individual's wishes are respected.'
Proponents of the living will argue that every individual has a right
to privacy and autonomy in making medical decisions.6 The United
States Supreme Court recently recognized this right in holding that a
competent person has a liberty interest under the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
The living will is a statutory creation; the form of the document,
the procedure for creating it, and the scope of its effect are provided by
statute.8 Thus, in states that have not passed enabling legislation, the
effect, if any, of a living will is unclear.9 In 1976 California passed the
first legislation recognizing living wills.10 At the time of this writing
4. Note, A Time to Be Born and a Time to Die: A Pregnant Woman's Right to Die with
Dignity, 20 IND. L. REV. 859, 859 (1987). The author emphasizes the Roe v. Wade decision, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), which held that the woman's privacy right is paramount until viability, but admits that
when the woman is comatose, the justifications for abortion are weaker. In such a case, the woman
does not suffer pain or emotional distress because of the continuation of the pregnancy. See id. at
872. Further, the author acknowledges the argument that the woman's failure to abort before the
onset of the coma suggests that she intended to carry the fetus to term. Id.
5. Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 737, 770.
6. Id. at 738.
7. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 58 U.S.L.W. 4916 (U.S. June 25, 1990). Nancy
Cruzan was left in a persistent vegetative state after an automobile accident. When doctors de-
cided that she had almost no chance of recovering her cognitive faculties, her parents sought a
court order to discontinue life support. Id. Ms. Cruzan had not executed a living will, but had told
a friend that she never would want to be artificially sustained unless she could live "at least half-
way normally." Id. at 4917. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to allow discontinuation of life
support, holding that the family of the incompetent patient must present clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wishes. Id. at 4916. The United States Supreme Court held that a compe-
tent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment in
refusing treatment. Id. at 4920. The Court also recognized the state's interest in ensuring that
withdrawal of life support is the patient's wish. Thus, the Court held that if the patient is incom-
petent, it is constitutionally permissible for the state to require clear and convincing evidence of
the patient's wishes. Id. at 4921.
8. Gould, Right to Die Legislation: The Effect on Physicians' Liability, 39 MERCER L. REV.
517, 519 (1988).
9. Id. at 525.
10. California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp.
1990).
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thirty-seven other states and the District of Columbia" have adopted
similar legislation.' 2
Twenty-seven of these statutes contain pregnancy clauses specify-
ing that the terminally ill or comatose patient's living will is suspended
if the patient is pregnant."3 The majority of these statutes suspend the
11. Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (1984); Alaska Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-18.12.100 (1986); Arizona Medical Treatment
Decision Act, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 36-3210 (1986); Arkansas Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to 20-17-218 (Supp. 1989);
Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to 15-18-113 (1987);
Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to 19a-575 (Supp.
1990); Delaware Death With Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); District of
Columbia Natural Death Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to 6-2430 (1989); Life-Prolonging Proce-
dure Act of Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-765.15 (West 1986); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-12 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act,
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to 327D-27 (1988); Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to
39-4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110/2, paras. 701-710
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IND. CODE
ANN. 8§ 16-8-11-1 to 16-8-11-22 (Burns 1990); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE
ANN. §8 144A.1-144A.11 (West 1989); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to
65-28,109 (1985); Louisiana Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to 40:1299.58.10 (West Supp. 1990); Maine Living Wills Act, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1989); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to 5-614 (1990); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mecha-
nisms Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to 41-41-121 (Supp. 1990); Missouri Uniform Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-459.055 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Montana Living
Will Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to 50-9-111, 50-9-201 to 50-9-206 (1989); Nevada With-
holding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-449.690
(1986 & Supp. 1989); New Hampshire Terminal Care Document, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1
to 137-H:16 (Supp. 1989); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-10
(1986); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-323 (1985);
Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1990); Oregon
Directive of Physician Act, OI. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605-127.650 (Supp. 1990); South Carolina Death
With Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to 44-77-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); Tennessee
Right to Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to 32-11-110 (Supp. 1990); Texas Nat-
ural Death Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-672.021 (Vernon 1990); Utah Per-
sonal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to 75-2-1118 (Supp. 1990);
Vermont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); Virginia Natu-
ral Death Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 54.1-2992 (1988 & Supp. 1990); Washington Natural
Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-70.122.905 (Supp. 1990); West Virginia Natural
Death Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to 16-30-10 (1985); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 154.01-154.15 (West 1989); Wyoming Living Will Act, WYo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to 35-22-
109 (1988).
12. See generally Gelfand, supra note 5, at 739-86. Each state statute varies as to what con-
stitutes a terminal condition or a condition sufficiently hopeless to justify effectuation of the living
will. Many of the statutes severely limit the circumstances in which the will can be invoked. For
example, half of the current living will statutes require that death be imminent, even with use of
life support procedures, before the living will can be executed. Id. at 741 & n.9. This requirement
almost nullifies any benefit to be obtained by executing a living will. Professor Gelfand's article
provides an exhaustive analysis comparing and contrasting current living will statutes.
13. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) (1986); ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-3205(D) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
7188 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-574 (Supp.
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patient's directive throughout the entire pregnancy,14 while the remain-
der suspend it only if the patient is carrying a fetus that could develop
to the point of live birth with continued use of life support.1" Conse-
quently, in many states a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose woman
in the early weeks of pregnancy could be forced to endure extensive
treatment for nine months against her express wishes. No court yet has
faced the issue of whether to give effect to a pregnant woman's duly
authorized living will.16 The issue will arise, however, given the pace of
technological advancement and the prevalence of pregnancy and cancer
occurring simultaneously. 17
This Note analyzes the legal and policy problems inherent in the
suspension of pregnant patients' living wills. Part II addresses federal
constitutional privacy issues raised by pregnancy clauses, and Part III
addresses state constitutional privacy issues. Part IV offers a less intru-
sive, more humane proposal for balancing the interests of the termi-
nally ill pregnant patient with the state's interest in protecting fetal
1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(d) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West 1986); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-6 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 12, para.
703(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11(d) (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §
144A.6(2) (West 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(2) (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
107 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3)
(1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14(I) (Supp. 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103(D) (West Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.019 (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109
(Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(2)
(West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102(b) (1988).
14. ALA. CODE § 22-SA-4(a) (1984); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-574 (Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(d) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.08 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-6 (1988);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11(d) (Burns 1990); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(2) (1990); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-107 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1990); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 449.610 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14(I) (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
3103(D) (West Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); TEx. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.019 (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(2) (West 1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-
22-102(b) (1988).
15. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) (1986); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(D) (1986); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101',
para. 703(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6(2) (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-9-202(3) (1989).
16. The Washington Supreme Court is the only court that has come close to addressing the
constitutionality of a pregnancy clause. In DiNino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 102 Wash. 2d 327, 684
P.2d 1297 (1984), the plaintiff, Joann DiNino, sought a declaratory judgment that the pregnancy
clause in the state living will statute was unconstitutional and void. Ms. DiNino had executed a
living will, but was neither pregnant nor terminally ill. The court did not reach the issue of the
statute's constitutionality because it held that the plaintiff had not presented a justiciable contro-
versy. Id. at 330-32, 684 P.2d at 1300-01.
17. Note, supra note 4, at 859 (citing Iochim, Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma in Pregnancy, 109
ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 803 (1985)).
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life. Part V concludes that states should refine the pregnancy provisions
in living will statutes although the scope of reproductive rights guaran-
teed by the federal constitution remains unclear.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PREGNANCY CLAUSES UNDER ROE V.
WADE AND WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES
Giving effect to a pregnant woman's living will necessarily requires
terminating her pregnancy. Living will statutes that suspend a woman's
directive during pregnancy infringe on her right to terminate the preg-
nancy. These statutes must be analyzed, therefore, in light of Roe v.
Wade 8 and its progeny.1 9 This examination reveals that a statute sus-
pending the woman's directive prior to viability of the fetus violates
both the constitutional privacy right and the public policies recognized
in the Roe decision.
A. The Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Roe Trimester
Framework
In Roe the Supreme Court found a right to privacy implicit in the
fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and struck down a
Texas statute criminalizing abortion. 20 This right, the Court held, en-
compasses a woman's right to choose whether to bear a child or termi-
nate the pregnancy.2 1 Like any other fundamental privacy right, this
right to choose is not absolute. The state may intervene in the woman's
decision when it has a compelling interest to protect, provided that it
employs the least intrusive means of intervention.2 In Roe the Supreme
Court identified two state interests: maternal health and the potential
life of the fetus. 3
The Court found that the state's interest in maternal health be-
comes compelling only after the first trimester.24 The state may not in-
terfere with the abortion decision during the first trimester, but may
regulate abortion to the extent necessary to protect the woman's health
after the end of that period. 5 In addition, the Court found that the
state's interest in fetal life becomes compelling only upon viability, the
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe defined the extent to which a state may interfere with the deci-
sion to terminate a pregnancy.
19. See infra Part II(C).
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 154-55.
23. Id. at 162.
24. Id. at 163. The Court explained, "This is so because of the now-established medical fact
... that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in
normal childbirth." Id.
25. Id.
1825
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point at which the fetus can live outside the woman's uterus.2 0 Viabil-
ity, the Court noted, generally occurs at about twenty-eight weeks of
pregnancy, or the end of the second trimester .2 At that point, a state
can prohibit abortion to protect the fetus.28
When a pregnant woman is terminally ill or comatose, the only
state interest that justifies interference with the directives of the living
will is the interest in fetal life. Thus, under Roe, the state may not pro-
hibit abortion before viability under the guise of a living will statute. 9
Yet a statute that suspends the will during the entire course of the
pregnancy 0 does just that. Moreover, the statutes that suspend the will
if the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with continued
maintenance of the woman's body3' also violate Roe's viability rule be-
cause cases obviously will arise in which a nonviable fetus could develop
to the point of live birth with enough time. To comply with the consti-
tutional directives of Roe, both types of statutes must be amended to
suspend the will only upon and after viability. More restrictive statutes
unconstitutionally infringe on the pregnant woman's fundamental right
to privacy and autonomy.
B. Policy Concerns
The Roe opinion focused on policy issues in addition to constitu-
tional law. The Court expressed concern that women who were denied
reproductive choice would suffer physical and psychological harm.2
The Court also noted that the birth of an unwanted child, particularly
when the family is unable, emotionally or otherwise, to care for the
child, could cause distress for all concerned.3 3 Although certain of the
Court's concerns, such as medical harm to the woman or infliction of a
difficult future, are not present in the living will context, others are
present and even more compelling.
The risk of psychological harm to the woman's partner and family
must be considered when a pregnant woman's body is maintained
against her express wishes. Courts should consider, as the Roe Court
did, the distress of all parties involved when the state forces the birth
of children whose parents cannot care for them. Indeed, the problems
26. Id.
27. Id. at 160. The Court explained that "[v]iability is usually placed at about seven months
(28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id.
28. Id. at 163-64.
29. See id. at 163; see also supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
30. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
33. Id.
1826 [Vol. 43:1821
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faced by these individuals would be greater because the child's birth
would coincide with the mother's death. The woman's survivors would
face both distress over the woman's death and the financial and emo-
tional problems of caring for a motherless child. Existing pregnancy
clauses in living will statutes are inconsistent with both the policy con-
cerns and the law set forth in Roe.
C. Effect of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services on the Roe
Doctrine
While these pregnancy clauses are unconstitutional under Roe, the
Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 4 limited
and arguably eviscerated both the holding and trimester framework of
Roe. The case concerned a constitutional challenge to a Missouri abor-
tion statute. 5 In conjunction with the abortion statute, the Missouri
legislature enacted a general provision, or a preamble, which states that
life begins at conception and that fetuses have protectable interests in
life, health, and well-being.3 6 This preamble requires courts to interpret
the laws of Missouri to recognize and protect the fetus's interests, lim-
ited only by the Constitution and the constitutional interpretations of
the United States Supreme Court.37 The abortion statute requires phy-
sicians to perform procedures necessary to determine whether the fetus
is viable before performing an abortion if the physician has reason to
believe that the fetus is at least twenty weeks old. 8
In upholding the statute, the Court did not address the constitu-
tionality of the preamble because the Court found that this provision
did not regulate abortion. 9 Rather, the Court construed the preamble
as merely expressing a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion
and conferring protections in tort and probate law on fetuses, both per-
missible legislative actions under Roe.40 In addition, the Court held that
state, not federal, courts control the extent to which the preamble may
be used to interpret state laws. 1
The Court explicitly recognized that requiring physicians to per-
form viability-determining procedures on twenty-week-old fetuses di-
rectly conflicts with Roe because inevitably the requirement would
result in the performance of procedures on nonviable second trimester
34. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
35. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.010-188.215 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (enacted 1986).
36. Id. § 1.205.1(1), (2); see Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3047.
37. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.2; see Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3047.
38. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.029.
39. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
40. Id.
41. Id.
1990] 1827
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fetuses.42 Thus, the state would be intervening in the abortion process
before viability.43  This intrusion violates Roe, which permits
previability intervention only to protect maternal health, not to protect
the fetus."
In its discussion, the Court openly questioned and criticized the
two key elements of the Roe framework, trimesters and viability. The
Court blamed the impracticability of the trimester framework for the
conflict between the framework and the Missouri statutory testing re-
quirements. 5 Moreover, the Court held that the testing requirements
permissibly advance the state's interest in protecting fetuses. 46 The
Court suggested that the state's compelling interest may exist through-
out the pregnancy and not, as Roe held, only upon and after viability.47
Thus, the Court advocated abandonment of the trimester system.48
Despite these conclusions, the Court expressly stated that it did
not overrule Roe.49 This determination was based, however, on a narrow
reading of the Roe decision. The Court characterized Roe as a decision
to strike down a statute that criminalized all nontherapeutic abor-
tions.50 The Court then reasoned that this decision was not overruled
directly because the statute involved in Webster merely prohibits pub-
lic funding and expands the procedural protections for fetuses.5 1
Through this reasoning, the Court recast Roe as a narrow, fact sensitive
holding rather than a landmark case establishing broad, fundamental
privacy rights. The current Court, therefore, is not bound by the Roe
trimester limits on state intervention and seems to recognize a broader
compelling state interest in the lives of fetuses.
D. Pregnancy Clauses in Light of Webster
Existing pregnancy clauses in living will statutes might survive Su-
preme Court scrutiny based on three elements of the Webster opinion.
First, the Court allowed state legislatures to make value judgments
42. Id. at 3056-57.
43. Id.
44. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The state interest involved in carrying out a pregnant woman's
living will is limited to protection of fetal life because by definition, the living will comes into play
only when maternal health is not at issue.
45. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056 (criticizing the trimester framework as "'unsound in princi-
ple and unworkable in practice'" (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 546 (1985))).
46. Id. at 3057.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3056-57; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
criticism of the trimester framework).
49. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 3050, 3052.
1828 [Vol. 43:1821
LIVING WILL STATUTES
favoring childbirth over abortion and permitted state courts to control
the use of these judgments in interpreting the law.52 Second, the Court
abandoned the trimester system.53 Finally, the Court recognized a
broader state interest in protecting fetuses. 4
Because state legislatures and courts can control the use of inter-
pretive provisions like the one in Webster, the lower federal courts and
the Supreme Court will address the extent of these statutes' effect only
after a state has used its control to restrict citizens' actions in concrete
ways.15 Therefore, the practical effect of these preambles will remain
unclear until the Supreme Court renders a decision. Meanwhile, in Mis-
souri or another state that adopts a preamble, a state court may uphold
the pregnancy clause in the living will statute based on the concern for
the sanctity of life and the preference for childbirth over abortion set
forth in that preamble.56
The Supreme Court also could uphold a pregnancy clause based on
broad state interests in fetal life because Webster abandoned the tri-
mester approach and expanded the scope of the state's interest in fetal
life. In allowing state intervention during the second trimester,57 Web-
ster has paved the way for Court approval of increased state-mandated
medical intervention at earlier stages during pregnancy. The decisive
factor likely will be how broadly the Court construes the state's compel-
ling interest in the life of the fetus. Because the Webster opinion sug-
gests that this interest may exist throughout pregnancy,58 the Court
might even uphold statutes that suspend the woman's directive during
the entire pregnancy. Whether the Court actually would hold that a
compelling state interest exists throughout pregnancy cannot be pre-
dicted at this point. Because the Court will defer strongly to state legis-
latures' value judgments and to state courts' statutory interpretations,
the contours of privacy rights increasingly will be determined at the
state level.
III. VALIDITY OF PREGNANCY CLAUSES UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY PROVISIONS
Even if pregnancy clauses are constitutionally permissible under
Webster's broad allowance for compelling state interest in fetal life,
they may not survive state constitutional scrutiny. Individual states
52. Id. at 3050.
53. Id. at 3056.
54. Id. at 3057.
55. Id. at 3050.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3057.
58. Id.
1990] 1829
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may include more expansive privacy rights in state constitutions than
those conferred by the federal constitution. 9 Several states whose living
will statutes contain pregnancy clauses have explicit privacy rights in
their constitutions."0
While no court has addressed the issue of whether pregnancy
clauses violate state constitutional privacy rights, courts in Florida and
California recently have decided cases concerning related constitutional
challenges to state statutes.6 1 Both Florida and California have living
will statutes that suspend the will throughout the entire pregnancy6 2
and have added explicit privacy rights to their constitutions .6  More-
over, courts in both states have held that state constitutional privacy
rights encompass both the right to decline life-prolonging treatment6 4
and the right to terminate a pregnancy.' An examination of the recent
state constitutional decisions in Florida and California suggests that the
broad pregnancy clauses in these states' living will statutes would not
survive state constitutional scrutiny.
A. State Constitutional Privacy Rights in Florida
In 1980 an explicit right of privacy was added to the Bill of Rights
of the Florida Constitution.6 The Supreme Court of Florida consis-
tently has emphasized the breadth of this privacy right.6 Invasions of
59. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). The Supreme Court up-
held the California Supreme Court's decision that the free speech guarantee in the California Con-
stitution conferred on the appellees the right to solicit signatures at a privately-owned shopping
mall. Id. at 79-80. The Court rejected the owner's claim that this reading of the state constitution
violated his federal constitutional property rights. Id. at 84-88. The Court emphasized that states
are free to use their police powers to establish more expansive individual freedoms than those
conferred by the federal constitution. Id. at 81.
60. See, e.g., ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 22; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA.
CONsT. art. I, § 23.
61. See infra notes 64-65.
62. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West
1986).
63. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
64. In Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1986), the court held
that the privacy right in the Florida Constitution protects the decision to decline treatment. A
California court similarly held that both the federal and state constitutions protect the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986).
65. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989), is the first Florida case to base the right to
choose abortion expressly on the state constitutional privacy right. In American Academy of Pedi-
atrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 51 (Ct. App. 1989), the court also
upheld the right to choose abortion, citing the state constitutional privacy right.
66. "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion
into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to
limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 23.
67. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 102 (Fla. 1989) (holding that com-
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the state constitutional privacy right are scrutinized strictly to ensure
that the state's action serves a compelling state interest through the
least intrusive means possible."8
Two recent cases, Corbett v. D'Alessandro69 and In re Guardian-
ship of Browning,70 explicitly held that the state constitutional privacy
right protects the decision to discontinue life-prolonging treatment. In
In re Guardianship of Browning, which examined a guardian's decision
to discontinue life support,71 the Florida District Court of Appeals
broadly interpreted the state's privacy right. The court emphasized that
the decision whether to withdraw life support turns on the subjective
wishes of the patient, rather than on public opinion, state or familial
preferences, or any objective test.72
Yet, Florida's living will statute interferes with this right to forego
treatment by suspending the will throughout pregnancy.73 Whether the
statute survives strict scrutiny depends on the scope of the state's com-
pelling interest in protecting fetal life. The Florida Supreme Court re-
cently defined the scope of that interest in a post-Webster decision
concerning a statute requiring parental consent for abortions performed
on a minor.74
petent patients' rights of privacy and religious freedom allow refusal of life-saving blood transfu-
sions); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987) (holding that state
constitutional privacy rights of blood donors prevent AIDS victims from using subpoenas to obtain
donors' names and addresses); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548
(Fla. 1985) (stating that "Article I, section 23, was intentionally phrased in strong terms," and that
"[t]he drafters of the amendment rejected the use of the words 'unreasonable' or 'unwarranted'
before the phrase 'governmental intrusion' in order to make the privacy right as strong as
possible").
68. Shaktman v. State, 529 So. 2d 711, 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 553 So. 2d 148
(Fla. 1989). Shaktman claimed that the warrantless use of pen registers to record numbers dialed
from home telephones violated the state constitutional privacy right. 529 So. 2d at 714. The court
recognized that the privacy right was implicated and reasoned that only a compelling state interest
implemented by the least intrusive means could justify the intrusion. Id. at 717. The court found
that the state had a compelling interest in investigating large-scale crimes and that pen registers
were among the least intrusive ways to investigate. Id. at 717-18.
69. 487 So. 2d at 368.
70. 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
71. Because Mrs. Browning's living will was unclear, the court focused on the process of the
guardian's decision on her behalf. Id. at 272.
72. Id. at 273. While the court cautioned the guardian to choose continued treatment if in
doubt about the patient's wishes, id. at 273, the court also stated that one "does not exercise
another's right of self-determination or fulfill that person's right of privacy by making a decision
which the state, the family, or public opinion would prefer." Id. at 269.
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West 1986).
74. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1186. The statute provides that before performing an abortion
on an unmarried woman under 18, the physician must obtain the written consent of the woman's
parent, custodian, or guardian, or the physician can rely on a circuit court order. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
390.001(4)(a) (West Supp. 1988). The minor can bypass the consent requirement upon a showing
of good cause, such as, inter alia, fear of abuse by the parent if the parent were asked to consent.
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In In re T. W.7 5 a minor sought a waiver of the requirement for
parental consent to have an abortion. The court began its analysis by
stating that although Webster had impugned the trimester framework
and even the basic holding of Roe, Roe remains valid law. 6 The court
did not address specifically the statute's constitutionality under Roe or
Webster, however, because it found that the statute did not survive
strict scrutiny under the state constitutional privacy right."
The court reasoned that the state's interest in maternal health
arises only at the end of the first trimester.78 Thus, the decision to ter-
minate a pregnancy before the end of the first trimester belongs solely
to the woman. As for the state's interest in protecting fetal life, the
court held that it becomes compelling only upon viability.79 The court
found, based on medical evidence, that viability occurs at the end of the
second trimester and will not be pushed back further in the foreseeable
future.80 The court concluded that the parental consent statute, which
interfered with the woman's privacy right from the moment of concep-
tion, was overbroad and not supported by a compelling state interest.81
In light of In re Guardianship of Browning2 and In re T.W.,83
which emphatically recognize individuals' rights to autonomy and pri-
vacy in death and child-bearing decisions, Florida's living will statute
would not survive state constitutional scrutiny. The statute, which sus-
pends the will during the entire pregnancy, is overbroad and fails to use
the least intrusive means to protect the state's interest in fetal life."' To
In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1188-89.
75. 551 So. 2d at 1189. Although the district court had declared the statute invalid and T.W.
already had obtained a legal abortion, the Supreme Court of Florida took jurisdiction because of
the important public policy implications of the privacy right issues. Id.
76. Id. at 1190.
77. Id. at 1196.
78. Id. at 1193-94.
79. Id. at 1194. Before viability, the court reasoned, the interests of the woman and the fetus
are indistinguishable, id. at 1193, and the state has no compelling interest in the life of the fetus.
Id. at 1193-94.
80. Id. at 1194. The court relied on Justice Harry Blackmun's Webster dissent for the asser-
tion that the viability threshold has remained stable. Id.; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067-79 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Jus-
tice Blackmun, in turn, based his statement on a New York State Task Force report that found
that" 'no technology exists to bridge the development gap between the three-day embryo culture
and the 24th week of gestation.'" Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075 n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (quoting Fetal Extrauterine Survivability, Report to the New York State
Task Force on Life and Law 10 (1988)).
81. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1194.
82. 543 So. 2d at 258.
83. 551 So. 2d at 1186.
84. See generally Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUm. L. REv. 1280
(1987) (arguing that state laws which limit the right of a pregnant woman to terminate her preg-
nancy are unconstitutional).
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survive a constitutional challenge in Florida, the living will statute can
suspend the woman's directive only if she is carrying a viable fetus.
B. State Constitutional Privacy Rights in California
In 1972 the word "privacy" was added to the list of inalienable
rights contained in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. 5
Since then California courts have held that this privacy right protects
both the decision to decline life-prolonging treatment86 and the decision
to terminate a pregnancy. 7 As in Florida, state action can infringe on
this privacy right only if it serves a compelling state interest and uses
the least intrusive means possible." Two California decisions concern-
ing abortion restrictions, one pre- and one post-Webster, illustrate the
broad scope of women's privacy rights under the state constitution and
the narrow scope of the state's interest in fetal life.
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers89 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court addressed whether state budget acts denying in-
digent women public funds for elective abortions violated the state
constitutional right of privacy and procreative choice. The court fo-
cused on state, rather than federal, constitutional issues9 ° and declined
to follow precedent set by the United States Supreme Court.9'
In strictly scrutinizing the funding denial, the court concluded that
the denial was an infringement on poor women's constitutional rights of
privacy and procreative choice.92 For this analysis, the court adopted
the three part test set forth in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospi-
85. Unlike the Florida legislature, which created a freestanding privacy right, the California
legislature simply added the word "privacy" to the list of inalienable rights in the state constitu-
tion. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
86. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137-38, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-01 (Ct.
App. 1986).
87. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 284, 625 P.2d 779,
798, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 885 (1981).
88. Id. at 257, 625 P.2d at 78, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868; see also supra note 68 and accompanying
text (discussing Florida case law). The court used the strict scrutiny test within the framework of
the three part test set out in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. App. 2d 499, 421
P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1966).
89. 29 Cal. 3d at 252, 625 P.2d at 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
90. Id. at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
91. The court refused to follow the Supreme Court decision in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980). Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868. In Harris the Supreme
Court upheld similar restrictions on federal Medicaid funding of abortions, reasoning that the gov-
ernment's refusal to fund abortion did not interfere impermissibly with constitutional rights of
women. Harris, 448 U.S. at 321-26.
92. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 270, 625 P.2d at 789, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 876. More specifically, the
court believed that the government, through state Medicaid funding decisions, was attempting to
deny women their government benefits solely because they exercised their constitutional right to
choose abortion. Id.
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tal District." To justify restrictions of constitutional rights, the state
must show: (1) that the restrictions relate to the aims of the statute
conferring the benefit or privilege, (2) that the benefit or utility of the
restrictions clearly outweighs the impairment of constitutional rights,
and (3) that no less offensive or intrusive means for achieving the
state's purpose exist.94 The court reasoned that the state's funding of
childbirth, but not abortion, did not pass the Bagley test because: first,
the denial of funding for abortion did not relate to the state Medicaid
program's purpose of providing indigent women access to medical care
comparable to that enjoyed by nonindigent women; second, the wo-
man's right to procreative choice was not outweighed by the lesser in-
terest of the state in protecting nonviable fetuses; and third, the denial
of funds was not the least offensive means of protecting indigent
women.
95
In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp,96 a post-
Webster case, the California Court of Appeals for the First District ap-
plied the Bagley three part test in addressing a constitutional challenge
to a statute requiring minors to obtain parental or judicial consent for
an abortion. The court reasoned that while parental consent laws do not
concern government funding, they do concern the government's deci-
sion to confer a benefit-the right to choose abortion without parental
interference-and thus, should be subject to the Bagley test. 7
In addition to analyzing abortion rights under the Bagley test, the
court emphasized that the question of whether women have a right to
procreative choice was settled by People v. Belous,98 a California deci-
sion predating Roe.9 9 Moreover, the court cited Myers in concluding
that state constitutional privacy rights are more extensive than federal
rights.100 This reliance on Belous and Myers suggests that California
93. 65 Cal. App. 2d at 499, 421 P.2d at 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 401. In Bagley the state govern-
ment allegedly had fired an employee because she exercised her first amendment right to free
expression. Id.
94. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 270, 625 P.2d at 789, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
95. The court also noted that even if the purpose of the program were to protect fetal life,
the restrictions would be vastly underinclusive because nonindigent women could have abortions,
and thus, the restrictions would protect only indigent fetuses. Id. at 281, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 883.
96. 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (Ct. App. 1989). The issue before the court was
whether a lower court had abused its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail
and granting a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the statute. 263 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
97. 263 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
98. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
99. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 47. The pregnancy clause in California's living will
statute seems even more inconsistent with the state constitution because the California courts rec-
ognized the right to a safe, legal abortion four years before the Supreme Court did so. See Belous,
71 Cal. 2d at 954, 458 P.2d at 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
100. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
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courts still adhere to the limits on governmental intrusion into the
abortion decision before viability set forth in those cases.
The Van de Kamp decision also suggests that state restrictions on
abortion are governed by California, not federal, law.1 1 California's liv-
ing will statute must be evaluated, therefore, in light of the California
Constitution and case law. The living will statute should be analyzed
under the Bagley test because, through the statute, the government
confers the benefit of specifying that an individual's wishes about medi-
cal treatment be followed. This analysis suggests that California's preg-
nancy clause would not withstand strict scrutiny.
The main purpose of California's living will statute is to allow indi-
viduals to forego life-prolonging treatment by exercising privacy, self-
determination, and personal autonomy rights over their own bodies. 102
The pregnancy restriction in California's statute, which suspends the
living will throughout the pregnancy, not only does not relate to the
purpose of the statute, but directly thwarts it. Thus, the restriction fails
the first part of the Bagley test.10 3
The restriction also appears to fail the second requirement that the
benefit or utility of the restriction manifestly outweigh the invasion of
privacy. The obvious benefit of suspending the living will during preg-
nancy is protection of fetal life from the moment of conception. As the
Myers and Van de Kamp decisions make clear, however, the state's in-
terest is not compelling, nor the benefit prevailing, until viability. 0 4
Because viability cannot occur before the twenty-third or twenty-
fourth week of pregnancy,10 5 the California statute would interfere with
the pregnant woman's privacy and autonomy rights for up to twenty-
four weeks with no countervailing benefit to the state. Further, just as
the funding restrictions in Myers were underinclusive in protecting only
indigent fetuses, the pregnancy restriction in the living will statute is
underinclusive in protecting only the fetuses of terminally ill or coma-
tose women.
Finally, the pregnancy clause does not serve the state's interests in
protecting the woman's privacy and the fetus's life in the least intrusive
manner possible. Because the state's interest in the fetus arises only at
101. See id.
102. See Gelfand, supra note 5, at 738. See generally id. (comparing and contrasting current
living will statutes).
103. The first requirement is that the restriction "relate to the purposes of the legislation
which confers the benefit." Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 271, 625 P.2d at 790, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (quot-
ing Bagley, 65 Cal. App. 2d at 505-06, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406).
104. The Myers court candidly stated that "the California Legislature has not embraced a
general policy of encouraging unwanted children." Id. at 278, 625 P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
882.
105. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160; see also supra note 27.
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viability, suspending the woman's directive throughout the entire preg-
nancy is unnecessarily intrusive. The state could protect its interest by
suspending the living will directive only after viability.
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Any solution to the problem of the terminally ill or comatose preg-
nant woman must take into account the following interests: (1) the in-
terest of the woman in privacy and personal autonomy; (2) the interest
of the woman's family and partner, or the father of the child, in decid-
ing whether to assume responsibility for raising the child after the wo-
man's death; and (3) the interest of the state in protecting potential
life. Two major problems with current living will statutes are their
sweeping infringement on women's privacy and autonomy and their
failure to account for the wishes of the woman's partner and family.
These problems could be addressed with a two-tiered pregnancy clause.
First, automatic suspension of the living will once the fetus has
reached viability, which for the foreseeable future remains at twenty-
three and one-half weeks of gestation, would serve the state's interest in
protecting the fetus.0 6 Second, the statute should provide that before
viability the woman may specify in her living will her desire that the
will be effectuated, or that her body be maintained until birth, or that
her partner or other family member act as her proxy in deciding
whether to carry the pregnancy to term. This second provision would
take into account a broad range of views on abortion and bodily integ-
rity. The option also would provide an alternative for the woman who
believes that the decision whether to terminate life support and preg-
nancy should be made by those who ultimately would be responsible for
raising the child.
V. CONCLUSION
The suspension of a pregnant woman's living will, particularly
without regard to the stage of pregnancy, directly contravenes the wo-
man's express wish for privacy and personal autonomy. Under the Roe
trimester system, evaluation of the constitutionality of these infringe-
ments was fairly simple and led to the conclusion that all current preg-
nancy clauses would violate fourteenth amendment privacy rights
because they operate to prohibit abortion before viability, the point at
which the state has a compelling interest in the life of the fetus.
In light of Webster, however, the status of current pregnancy
clauses is unclear. This status depends on how far the current Supreme
106. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1989).
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Court would go in sanctioning previability prohibitions on abortion.
The Webster decision did establish that the Court recognizes broader
state interests in protecting fetuses, thus giving states broader discre-
tion to interfere with the personal decisions of pregnant women. Re-
gardless of whether the Court in the future gives states sweeping power
to prohibit abortion, some state legislatures will be restrained by their
own constitutions and court decisions.
While the suggested proposal is more complex than the simple sus-
pension of the will during pregnancy, it merely reflects the diverse in-
terests at odds in such cases. Current living will legislation serves the
state's interest in protecting the fetus by sacrificing completely the in-
terests of the woman and her survivors. In addition, constitutional con-
cerns aside, the current statutes are unwise from a policy standpoint
because they operate to force unwanted children on fathers and families
who may be unable, emotionally or financially, to care for the children.
The suggested proposal would be constitutional and would avoid these
policy problems.
Elizabeth Carlin Benton
1990] 1837

